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CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR THE UTILITY 
INVESTOR: THE CONFISCATION DOCTRINE AFTER 
CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO. v. 
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO 
Robert E. Cleaves, IV* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nuclear power generation in the United States has experienced 
a short and troubled history. I In 1953, utility companies began a 
major commitment to nuclear power.2 Twenty years later, nuclear 
power reached a highwater mark, as state and federal agencies 
authorized a record number of mega-watts to be drawn from 
nuclear facilities. 3 In a short period of time , the energy industry 
witnessed a drastic change in the market. From 1972 to 1982, over 
100 plants were cancelled.4 Economic losses were profound. The 
* Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAms LAW REVIEW. Editor-
in-Chief, 1984-85. 
1 Though nuclear power was first developed in the 1940s, it was not until 1953 that 
Congress authorized the use of nuclear fission for non-military, commercial distribution. 
ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF COAL, NUCLEAR, ELECTRIC AND 
ALTERNATIVE FUELS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, NUCLEAR PLANT 
CANCELLATIONS: CAUSES, COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES 4 (1983) [hereinafter cited as 
PLANT CANCELLATIONS]. This report provides a helpful sketch of the history of cancella-
tions, the regulatory treatment in various states, and the reasons for termination. 
, The history of atomic development in the United States actually dates back to 1946, 
when Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1982). This statute 
created the Atomic Energy Commission. In 1954, the Act was amended to authorize the 
non-military use of atomic power. In 1959, the first private nuclear generating plant 
went "on line" at Dresden, Illinois. C. COOK, NUCLEAR POWER AND LEGAL ADVOCACY 1-2 
(1980). 
3 PLANT CANCELLATIONS, supra note 1, at 4. 
4 [d. Between 1972 and 1983, the industry cancelled plants at a progressive rate: seven 
in 1972; zero in 1973; seven in 1974; 13 in 1975; one in 1976; 10 in 1977; 14 in 1978; eight in 
1979; 16 in 1980; six in 1981; and 18 in 1982. [d. at 5. The 100 cancelled units had the 
potential capacity of 110,000 MWe of electricity. Many of the plants cancelled were well 
beyond the planning stage. For example, of the 40 units cancelled between 1980 and 1982, 
18 were already under construction. [d. at 6. 
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Public Service Company of Indiana, for example, had invested 
nearly $2.5 billion in its Marble Hill nuclear project before decid-
ing to abandon the plant.5 In Massachusetts, Boston Edison Com-
pany decided to cancel Pilgrim II's construction after making an 
investment of $278 million.6 In Washington, the problem was 
particularly severe. In the largest municipal bond failure in 
American history, the Washington Public Power Supply System 
(WPPSS) cancelled its two largest facilities and defaulted on $2.25 
billion in bonds.7 Facilities surviving this cancellation trend face 
considerable pressure from both ratepayers and investors to re-
consider continued construction.s 
The reasons for this abrupt change in the feasability of nuclear 
power are varied and complex. According to a study of cancella-
tions conducted by the United States Department of Energy, 
lower forecasted growth in the public's use of electricity contrib-
uted to the demise of nuclear power.9 Prior to the Arab Oil Em-
bargo of 1973, the industry embarked on a vigorous effort to 
construct nuclear facilities. After 1973, fuel costs increased, and 
consumers were forced to conserve energy.tO As a result of this 
conservation effort, many power companies had excess capacity 
and little need for expanded facilities. 
5 Lueck, Nuclear Costs Stirs India'YU! 'Rate Shock,' N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1984 at D1, cols. 
3,4. 
6 Attorney General v. Department of Public Utilities, 390 Mass. Adv. Sheets 208, 210, 
455 N.E.2d 414, 415 (1983). 
7 Stoler, Pulling The Nuclear Plug, TIME, February 13, 1984, at 34. The possible 
bankruptcy of WPPSS has resulted in substantial litigation. Arson v. City of Burley, 105 
Idaho 432, 670 P.2d 839 (1983); Chemical Bank v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 99 
Wash. 2d 772, 666 P.2d 329 (1983); and financial chaos, Washington Supply System 
Defaults, Creating Uncertainties for Northwest, 11 ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 757, 
757-58 (July 28, 1983). 
8 For instance, on January 17, 1984, the Cincinnati Ohio City Council adopted a 
resolution calling for the abandonment of Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company's Zim-
mer facility. Holuska, Another Nuclear Plant May Be Dropped, N.Y. Times, January 18, 
1984, at A12, col. 1. 
9 PLANT CANCELLATIONS, supra note 1, at 7. 
10 Id. at 7. The study notes that between 1966 and 1972, energy forecasters predicted a 
seven percent annual growth rate in electricity usage. These reports prompted the 
energy industry to revise its schedule of the construction of nuclear plants to meet the 
increased demand. With the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973, the predictions of the past six 
years were radically revised. The Embargo caused a sharp increase in prices, which in 
turn resulted in impressive conservation efforts. From 1973 to 1982, the study documents 
a continued downward trend in long term energy use. Id. at 7. See also Pierce, The 
Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect: Cancelled Plants and Excess Capacity, 
132 U. PA. L. REV. 497 (1984). 
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In addition to excess capacity, the industry was plagued by an 
ever-changing regulatory maze. In 1971, for example, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuitll ruled that 
prior to the granting of a construction permit, the Atomic Energy 
Commission must prepare an environmental impact statement 
pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.12 The 
industry was also hampered by administrative obstacles stem-
ming from the Three Mile Island accidentY Following the event, 
the Nuclear Energy Regulatory Commission (NRC) adopted a 
number of measures which caused delays in construction. For 
example, the NRC imposed a ten month moratorium on the is-
suance of operating licenses, and subjected state and local evacu-
ation plans to federal scrutiny.14 The regulatory requirements 
contributed to cancellations by imposing additional construction 
costs, particularly in the area of plant designs.15 
A highly inflationary economy also contributed to cancellations. 
The construction of Indiana's Marble Hill facility was estimated 
at $1.4 billion in 1975;16 prior to its cancellation in 1984, the com-
pletion estimate was $7 billionY The Michigan Consumers Power 
Company's Midland plant, though still under construction in 1984, 
increased in price from $267 million in 1965 to an estimated $3.4 
billion upon completion.18 And in New York, Long Island Lighting 
Company's Shoreham nuclear facility, whose future remains un-
11 Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm. v. United States, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
12 The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976 & Supp. V 
1981), provides that "every recommendation or report or proposal for legislation and 
other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the 'human environ-
ment' must include a detailed statement discussing the environmental impact of the 
proposed action." 
13 On March 28, 1979, water pumps malfunctioned at Metropolitan Edison's Unit 2 at 
Three Mile Island, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. As a result of the malfunction, the nuclear 
reactor's radioactive core was temporarily exposed. 
14 PLANT CANCELLATIONS, supra note 1, at 26. 
15 The Department of Energy study notes the quantitative impact of regulatory 
changes on the high incidence of plant cancellations. Of the companies with cancelled 
plants between 1973 and 1982, no firm relied on regulatory changes as the primary 
justification for termination. Despite this finding, the study reports that regulatory 
changes are the third most commonly cited reason for cancellation; the industry claims 
that these changes influenced the cancellation of 38 facilities. PLANT CANCELLATIONS, 
supra note 1, at 26. 
16 Supra note 5, at col. 4. 
17 Id. 
16 Id. See also Stoler, supra note 7, at 39. 
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certain, has a completion price of $4 billion19-a drastie increase 
from its $241 million estimate in 1965.20 
Rising costs only increased the need for borrowing. Contrary to 
the period of 1960 to 1965, when over half the capital required for 
construction came from the utility's internal sources" by 1980, 
external borrowing contributed to fifty.three percent of the 
needed capital,21 Industry dependence on external borrowing was 
further exacerbated by the inability to raise capital in the securi~ 
ties market. The original premise that nuclear generation was the 
most profitable and efficient method of generating electricity22 
was no longer unassailable.23 In fact, by 1982, the U.S. Depart· 
ment of Energy found that new nuclear facilities would offer 
economic advantages over coal fired facilities only in the New 
England and South Atlantic regions.24 
This analysis had unavoidable consequences for the private 
investor.25 Between 1965 and 1980, the average rate of return on a 
stockholder's investment declined. Market prices became de· 
pressed and investors were steered away from utility stocks.26 The 
down turn was so dramatic that by early 1984, some utility stock 
prices were down as much as 50% from their 1983 value.27 A direct 
consequence of this decline was the reduction of the companys' 
earnings per share.28 To reverse this devaluation, utilities em· 
barked on a "capital minimi2;ation" strategy.29 Rather than issue 
19 [d. 
20 [d. 
21 PLANT CANCELLATIONS, supra note 1, at 19. According to the study, among the 
internal sources relied on for construction include retained earnings, depreciation, and 
deferred taxes. 
22 [d. at 26. 
23 [d. 
24 The study also found that in the southwest and north central regions of the United 
States, coal-fired plants had a clear economic advantage. 
25 PLANT CANCELLATIONS, supra note 1, at 4-32. See also ENERGY INFORMATION 
ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, STATISTICS OF PRIVATELY 
OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980 ANNUAL CLASSES A AND B 
COMPANIES (1981); FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, STATISTICS OF PRIVATELY OWNED 
ELECTRIC UTILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1974 (1975); MOODY'S PUBLIC UTILITY 
MANUAL, VOL. 1 (1981); SALOMON BROTHERS, MARKET RESEARCH GROUP (1982). 
26 PLANT CANCELLATIONS, supra note 1, at 25. For example, the Public Service Com-
pany of New Hampshire'S stock dropped from $20 a share to $8 in six months. This 
decline coincided with the decline in confidence over the unfinished Seabrook II facility 
and statements by company auditors that bankruptcy was a possible consequence. Stein, 
Public Service Stock Hits a Low, Boston Globe, April 4, 1984, at 37. 
27 N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1984, at D1, cols. 1, 2. 
28 PLANT CANCELLATIONS, supra note 1, at 25. 
29 [d. 
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new stock, companies reduced investments in anticipation of slow-
ing the downward slide in stock prices. In the effort to restore the 
financial health of the utility, such capital intensive projects as 
nuclear facilities were often the first to be dropped.30 
The dramatic losses created by cancellation have prompted 
investors and the consuming public to question who should bear 
the costs. To the privately owned power industry, the answer is 
simple. Since a public utility is a joint enterprise involving private 
capital and public regulation, the risks associated with the in-
vestment must be shared.31 A majority of state jurisdictions,32 and 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,33 agree with this 
position, and apportion the costs of cancelled facilities among both 
consumers and investors. An alternative approach to this sharing 
of costs emphasizes the lack of any tangible benefits to consum-
ers.34 Finding that cancelled projects are of no use to the con-
sumer,35 a growing number of state regulatory commissions have 
denied any recovery of the investment in the rate structure.36 
Utility companies have responded to this denial by challenging 
the legal authority of a state to deny any recovery through rates. 
It is asserted that state regulatory agencies are engaged in un-
constitutional rate-making.37 According to the utilities, the state 
has confiscated their property in violation of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments to the United States Constitution.38 It is 
argued that by requiring the utility to provide efficient and ade-
quate electrical service, the state has encouraged the develop-
ment of nuclear power.39 When the facility is cancelled, the state, 
through its rate-making power, prevents the industry from re-
ceiving an adequate return on its investment.40 According to the 
30 Id. The study notes that nuclear plants have 30 to 100 percent higher capital costs 
than coal fired facilities. 
31 See infra at note 111. 
32 See infra text and notes at notes 112-14. 
33 See, e.g., Northern States Power Co., 17 F.E.R.C. (61, 196) at 61, 379 (1981); Anaheim, 
Riverside, Banning, Colton & Azusa v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 669 F.2d 
799, 809 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
34 This is the used and useful approach to cancellation costs. See infra text and notes 
at notes 144-52. 
35 Stoler, supra note 7, at 34. 
36 Infra at note 114. 
37 Id. 
36 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
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utility industry, this return falls below the constitutional mini-
mum as recognized by the United States Supreme Court.41 
This article will focus on the constitutional parameters of utility 
rate-making, with particular emphasis on the issue of cancellation 
costs of privately owned utilities.42 Section II examines the rate-
making process and provides an overview of how state and federal 
agencies adjust utility rates. The three components of a rate-
making scheme-operating expenses, the ratebase, and the rate 
of return-will be discussed. Section III explores how cancellation 
costs are accommodated within this process. A survey of the 
various methods of treating cancellation costs illustrates that 
while a minority of states either grant or deny the utility the 
entire amount, a majority of jurisdictions apportion losses among 
both investors and consumers. 
Finally, Section IV reviews the constitutional challenge to com-
plete denial in Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. v. Public 
Utilities Commission of Ohio. Beginning with a general discus-
sion of takings in the context of public utilities, the analysis turns 
to Ohio's regulatory scheme and alleged constitutional infirmities. 
The significance of rulings by the Ohio courts and United States 
Supreme Court will then be discussed. The article concludes by 
suggesting that while constitutional limitations on state rate-
making do exist, legislatures can adopt laws which deny any 
recovery of expenses incurred in the construction of cancelled 
plants. 
II. THE RATE-MAKING PROCESS 
An analysis of how cancellation costs are apportioned by state 
and federal regulatory agencies necessitates a general description 
of the rate-making process. The role which government plays in 
the field of public utilities can be traced to the 19th century, when 
a combination of market forces and public demand resulted in 
regulation over certain industries in the private sector.43 By the 
" Id. 
" The utility industry consists of both public and private companies; only the latter is 
discussed in this article. Such public facilities as the Tennessee Valley Authority and the 
Washington Public Power Supply Company have unique regulatory problems upon 
cancellation of a plant. In contrast to privately owned facilities, where both investors 
and ratepayers divide the costs of cancellation, public facilities can only resort to 
ratepayers for recovery. See generally PLANT CANCELLATIONS, supra note 1, at 3S. 
43 For a general history of government regulation of the private sector, see generally 
FAINSOD, GORDON & PALAMOUNTAIN, GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (3d 
ed. 1959). 
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20th century, this regulation had great impact on public utilities. 
Both state and federal agencies created utility commissions, 
which are responsible for overseeing the public utility enter-
prise . .J4 A primary responsibility of these commissions is the set-
ting of utility rates. This is achieved by adopting a rate-making 
"formula," which is calculated by considering the various ex-
penses incurred by the utility, and determining what expenses 
are to be passed on, through rates, to the consumers. 
A. The History of Public Utility Regulation 
The origins of public utility regulation can be understood with 
reference to market forces. Under a perfect market system, com-
petition among enterprises fosters the lowest possible prices for 
the consumer and the most efficient distribution of scarce re-
sources. However, when the marketplace is dominated by only a 
single or by few enterprises, efficiency and economy are no longer 
promoted; instead, output is reduced and prices increase. To com-
bat these adverse effects, the government restricts market 
dominance.45 
For industries "clothed with a public interest,"46 regulation took 
a different form. Government recognized that some enterprises 
continued to function efficiently and in the public interest by 
dominating the marketY Therefore, instead of attacking their 
market power, both state and federal governments imposed con-
tinuous supervision. In the early 19th century, state governments 
assumed this supervisory role by regulating innkeepers, carriers, 
and ferrymen.48 By the 1870's, states imposed restrictions on grain 
warehouse rates; and by the 1880's, railroads were subject to 
regulation in 30 states and territories.49 At the federal level, Con-
+! ld. 
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-6 (1976 & Supp. 1981). For a general discussion of antitrust laws, see 
generally P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW..AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRIN-
CIPLES AND THEIR ApPLICATION (5 VOLS.) (1978, 1980); L. SCHWARTZ, J. FLYNN & H. 
FIRST, FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: ANTITRUST (1983); L. SULLI-
VAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST (1977). 
46 See infra text at note 169. 
17 E. NICHOLS, RULING PRINCIPLES OF UTILITY REGULATION, RATE OF RETURN 70 
(1955). 
4Il For example, in 1820, Congress permitted the District of Columbia the power of 
supervising private wharves and chimney sweeping. Act of May 15, 1820, Ch. 104, § 7, 3 
Stat. 587. See also SCHWARTZ, supra note 45, at 31. 
i9 SCHWARTZ, supra note 45, at 31. 
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gress responded with the creation of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission.50 This combination of state and federal regulation 
has, throughout the 20th century, resulted in supervision over a 
wide range of industries, including transportation, communica-
tions and energy.51 
Government regulation over private industry takes many 
forms.52 Antitrust laws, for example, have an indirect effect on 
industry by proscribing certain behavior in the marketplace.53 
Economic regulation, on the other hand, has a direct impact on 
the industry, as the regulator-often granted the authority of 
setting rates-substitutes the forces of the marketplace with pre-
scribed revenue requirements and maximum rates of return.54 
The regulation of nuclear power is primarily economic. Commis-
sions are authorized to assure fair prices, adequate service, and a 
reasonable rate of return for the utility investor.55 
B. The Elements of the Rate-making/Rate of Return Approach 
The primary concern of a public utility regulator is the fixing of 
rates.56 Often acting under a broad statutory mandate to set rates 
that are "just and reasonable,"57 state and federal regulatory 
commissions determine a rate structure that defines which costs 
are to be passed along to the consumer, and dictates the proper 
rate of return to the utility investor. The traditional formula in 
setting rates is the Ratebase/Rate of Return approach: operating 
expenses ("0") plus the rate base (RB) multiplied by the rate of 
return (RR)(O + RB x RR).58 
Operating expenses, the first component in the formula, are 
simply those reasonable costs incurred by the utility in providing 
50 The commission was created through the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 u.s.c. § 11 
(1976). 
51 ScHWARTZ, supra note 45, at. 31. 
52 E. GEILHORN & R. PIERCE, REGULATED INDUSTRIES 7 (1982). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 7-8. 
55 Id. at 8. 
56 J. BAUER, UPDATING PUBUC UTILITY REGULATION 1 (1966). 
57 In New York, for example, the Public Service Commission enforces PuB. SERVo LAW 
§ 65(1) (McKinney 1984), which states in pertinent part: "AU charges made or demanded 
by any such gas cOrpQration, electric corporation or municipality for gas, electricity or 
any service rendered or to be rendered, shall be just and reasonable and not more than 
allowed by law or order by the commission." 
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the public adequate service.59 Some of the more cQmmon expense 
items include maintenance, depreciation and all taxes.oo More 
controversial are advertising outlays, which have been included 
as a cost of rendering service, and losses incurred in the unprofit .. 
able pursuit of business, which are often not categorized as an 
operating expense.61 One commentator notes that "reasonable-
ness" is the guiding principle when categorizing operating ex-
penses.62 According to this assertion, if the utility incurs the ex-
penses, it is prima facie reasonable and the burden rests on the 
party challenging the expense to prove otherwise.63 Another 
commentator's interpretation of what constitutes operating ex-
penses is based on the "good faith" standard.64 It is argued that 
absent management's bad faith, a regulatory commission cannot 
"ignore the necessary, fair and reasonable expense of operation 
incurred in the rendition of service" and must "allow such ex-
penses constituting charges upon income .... '~ 
Once a regulatory commission determines that an item is an 
operating expense, the utility does not receive the entire amount 
in one rate determination. Rather, the cost is amortized over a 
fixed period of time.66 By spreading the cost over several years, 
consumers do not make a single payment for property that pro-
duces only incremental benefits. To the investor, amortization 
58 J>,... PRIEst', PRINCIPLES OF PuBUC UTILITY REGULATION 45 (1969). The formula 
has been stated a number of ways. See GELLHORN & PIERCE, supra note 52, at 97 n.l. 
59 PRIEST, supra note 58, at 45. See alBo BAUER, supra note 56, at 2-4. 
60 The classification of all taxes as operating expenses is well established law. PRIEst', 
supra note 59, at 51. As Justice Brandeis stated in Galveston Elec. Co. v. City of 
Galveston, 258 U.S. 388, 399 (1922), "[i]t is necessary to deduct from gross revenues the 
expense and charges, including all taxes." 
61 The exclusion of losses incuJ:red in the unprofitable operation of a utility's business 
has been recognized in a number of jurisdictions. See, e.g., Re Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 23 
PUB. UTIT... REP. 3d (PUR) 209, 217-218 (Cal. Pub. Uti!. Comm'n 1958); Re Arkansas Power 
& Light Co., 13 PuB. UTIL. REP. 3d (PUR) 1, 22-23 (Ark. Pub. Servo Comm'n 1956); Re 
Consumers Power Co., 99 PUR (n.s.) 95, 96 (Mich. Pub. Ser. Comm'n 1953); Re Asbury 
Rapid Transit Sys., 95 PUR (n.s.) 490, 496-97 (1952). It has been argued that this 
accounting principle would exclude the cancellation costs of nuclear power plants. 
62 BAUER, supra note 56, at 3. 
63 Id. 
64 PRIEST, supra note 58, at 50. 
65 Id. at 50. 
66 Id. at 67. For an illustration of how the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
defines amortization, see 18 C.F.R. 101 (1984), which describes the accounting principle in 
the following manner: "[T]he gradual extinguishment of an amount in an account by 
distributing such amount over a fixed period, over the life of the asset or liability to 
which it applies, or over the period during which it is anticipated the benefit will be 
realized." 
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prevents the immediate advantage of an expense whose useful 
life is longer than the rate period. 
Added to operating expenses is the second component of the 
formula, the rate base. This component is "the total investment in, 
or fair value of, the facilities of a utility employed in providing 
its service."67 While jurisdictions disagree over the appropriate 
method to use in measuring the value of the base,68 a completed 
project will often be included in the rate structure if it is deter-
mined that construction was "prudent" or "used and useful" to 
the consumer.69 As stated by Justice Brandeis in Missouri ex rel. 
Southwestern Bell Tele. v. Missouri Pub. Servo Comm'n, prudence 
involves "investments which, under ordinary circumstances, 
would be declared reasonable."70 Similar to operating expenses, 
there is a presumption that reasonable judgement is exercised. 
The burden, however, rests on the party challenging the invest-
ment.n 
The "used and useful" concept is controversial.72 The principle 
is based on the belief that consumers should only be burdened 
with a utilities' expenses if there is some immediate benefit to the 
public.73 Absent a statutory mandate to exclude all property not 
providing current service to the consumer,74 some regulatory 
commissions, through their discretionary authority, have ex-
panded the concept to include cancelled facilities that were pru-
dently constructed but which provided no direct benefit to the 
consumer,15 
When costs involve the construction of facilities, a commission 
must consider whether the cost of "construction work in progress" 
(CWIP)16 and "allowance for funds used during construction" 
(AFUDC)17 are to be included. CWIP costs, which include labor, 
67 PRIEST, supra note 58, at 139. 
68 [d. 
69 [d. See also NEPCO Mun. Rate Comm'n v. F.E.R.C., 668 F.2d 1327, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 
1981). 
70 262 U.S. 276, 289 n.!. 
71 [d. 
n See Denver Union Stockyard Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 470, 475 (1938); 
United Gas Pub. Servo CO. V. Texas, 303 U.S. 123, 144 (1938). 
73 See infra text and notes at notes 144-52. 
74 See infra text and notes at notes 115-42. 
75 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Power & Light CO. V. Pennsylvania Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 128 
Pa. Super. 195, 193 A.427, 19 PUR (n.s.) 433; Goodwin V. Pub. Servo Comm'n. of D.C., 497 
F.2d 661 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
76 PLANT CANCELLATIONS, supra note 1, at 37. See also EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, 
SURVEY ON CONSTRUCTION WORK IN PROGRESS IN RATE BASE (1976). 
77 [d. 
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materials, and property, are frequently denied rate-base treat-
ment by the discretion of the regulatory commission because they 
are not "used and useful" to the public.78 When CWIP costs a.re 
denied, utilities are often permitted to recover the expense 
through AFUDC by accumulating the cost of capital in CWIP.79 
AFUDC costs are essentially the accumulated costs of capital in 
constructing the plant. They can be incurred through interest 
payments in debt financing, or dividend payments to both pre-
ferred and common shareholders. Upon completion of the facility, 
both CWIP costs and accumulated AFUDC costs become incorpo-
rated in the ratebase. Through this method, utilities earn a de-
ferred return on CWIP expenses.80 
Once the ratebase has been determined, the final task is to 
select a percentage figure rate of return. This rate is multiplied by 
the base to establish a fair return for the utility investor.81 The 
rate of return involves the cost of capital incurred in the financing 
of a project. A substantial amount of capital is borrowed through 
debt financing and preferred stock, both requiring annual inter-
est and dividend payments. Additional capital is raised through 
common equity shareholders who demand a return on their in-
vestment.82 
There is no precise formula for calculating a fair rate ofreturn.83 
Unlike the ratebase, which is determined largely by the discretion 
of the regulatory commission, the fair rate of return is subject to 
substantive judicial review to insure that the return granted does 
not amount to an unconstitutional taking.84 
As a primary function of regulatory commissions, the setting of 
rates involves the classification of costs into the various compo-
nents of the rate-making formula. Regulators are granted broad 
'" As clarified by the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities, excluding CWIP 
costs is not a determination that the utility does not deserve a return on invested capital; 
rather, "it simply is a policy choice to defer recovery of those legitimate earnings until 
the project is completed." See infra note 115, at 456. 
'9 E. GELLHORN, REGULATED INDUSTRIES 122 (1982). 
XO Id. 
"' PRIEST, supra note 58, at 191. 
"" One commentator likens the rate of return to no more than a fishing license: "The 
utility's return allowance might be compared to a hunting or fishing license with a limit 
on the catch. Such a license does not guarantee that the holder will catch anything at all; 
it simply makes the catch legal (up to a specified limit) provided the holder is successful 
in his efforts." F. WELCH, CASES AND TEXT ON PUBUC UTIUTY REGULATION 478 (1968). 
83 See generally BAUER, supra note 57, at 14-73. 
84 See infra text and notes at notes 153-205. 
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authority in the rate-making process, and exercise wide discretion 
in determining what costs incurred by the utility will be passed 
along to the consumer. In recent years, the costs of cancelled 
nuclear facilities have been the center of controversy in rate-
making proceedings. 
III. INCLUSION OF CANCELLATION COSTS 
The costs associated with cancelled nuclear facilities can repre-
sent a high percentage of a utility's capital expenditures. In the 
rate-making process, utilities request the recovery of these costs 
through higher rates. It is the responsibility of the regulatory 
commission to determine the revenue requirements of the utility 
and insure the utility a fair rate of return on its investment. This 
section reviews the expenses incurred by a utility in the cancella-
tion of a nuclear facility. Following this discussion is a survey of 
the methods employed by various jurisdictions in apportioning 
the expenses between the rate-payer and the investor. 
The termination of a plant is a costly matter. Cancellation costs 
include a large outlay of cash expenditures devoted to the pur-
chase of land, labor, materials, equipment, studies, and permits 
and licenses.85 Additionally, the utility incurs AFUDC, contract 
cancellation penalties,86 salvage value,87 and site shutdown ex-
penses. To recoup these losses, the utility appeals to the proper 
regulatory commission, requesting a rate increase that reflects 
the increased revenue requirements to cover the expense.88 The 
agency then faces the difficult and controversial task of properly 
characterizing the losses. 
As previously discussed, cancellation costs can be considered 
either as operating expenses or as a portion of the rate base. 89 
When a commission excludes recovery, the investor assumes the 
entire loss. If, however, the commission places the costs under 
either category of the rate-making formula, the issue becomes 
)Vhether the full amount is to be recouped. If the utility is granted 
- .~ According to the Department of Energy Study, these cash expenditures are often 
tr,e largest portion of the cancellation expense and, at the time of cancellation, the 
expense most accurately known. PLANT CANCELLATIONS, supra note 1, at 37. 
- 86 These penalties occur when the plant is cancelled prior to the completion of contract 
,work with vendors .. While settlements are often negotiated, this abandonment cost is 
significant.ld. 
-- "1 The salvage value, while not a direct cost, is considered a "negative" cost. It is the 
amount gained from the resale of the abandoned facility. 
86 PLANT CANCELLATIONS, supra note 1, at 33-38. 
89 See supra text and notes at notes 59-82. 
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recovery, an additional consideration is whether the costs will be 
recouped in one rate adjustment, or amortized over a number of 
years. Unique statutory schemes and varying regulatory prac-
tices defy broad generalizations about cancellation cost treat-
ment. Despite different approaches, apportionment falls into 
three broad categories: complete recovery of the investment; par-
tial recovery with varying time periods of amortization and, in 
some cases, disallowance of the cost of capital; or complete denial 
of costs associated with a plant not currently used and useful. 
A. Full Recovery of Costs 
New York is the only jurisdiction to grant utilities full recovery 
of cancellation costs on a regular basis.90 Given the authority to 
set rates that are "just and reasonable,''91 the New York Public 
Service Commission (NYPSC) permits recovery despite the gen-
eral principle in the regulatory field to deny a portion of the 
investment.92 The loss is categorized as an operating expense, 
amortized over a period of time. The unamortizable component of 
the rate-making formula, the ratebase, assumes the cost of capi-
tal.93 
The decision of the NYPSC in Re Rochester Gas & E. COrp.94 
illustrates this treatment of cancellation costs. In 1980, Roches-
ter Gas & Electric Corporation joined three other area utilities95 in 
requesting the permission to recover their investment in the 
cancelled Sterling power project.96 The utilities argued that costs 
for the construction of the physical plant were "operating ex-
penses"97 that should be amortized. The balance of the loss, the 
cost of capital and AFUDC, should receive rate base treatment.98 
In opposing this comprehensive recovery, consumer groups ar-
gued that because public utilities are joint economic ventures 
between consumers and investors,99 there should be an equitable 
00 PLANT CANCELLATIONS, supra note 1, at 49. 
91 N.Y. PUB. SERVo LAW, § 65, subd. 1; § 66, subd. 12; § 72 (McKinney 1984). 
9~ See infra text and notes at notes 111-52. 
93 PLANT CANCELLATIONS, supra note 1, at 49. 
94 45 PUB. UTIL. REP. 4th (PUR) 386 (1982), Opinion No. 82-1. 
'" These included Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc., Central Hudson Gas and Elec-
tric Corporation, and Niagra Mohawk Power Corporation. [d. at 387. 
!J6 [d. at 387. 
97 [d. 
9" [d. 
99 [d. at 391. 
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sharing of costs. The NYPSC disagreed, and adopted the ap-
proach of the utility. 
Beginning with the premise that the investment in the project 
is an amortizable operating expense,IOO the NYPSC refused to 
depart from the common practice of including capital cost in the 
ratebase, "irrespective of the relative benefits that may have 
flowed from the abandoned or incomplete project."101 The commis-
sion refused to accept the economic argument, asserted by Com-
missioner Mead in a vigorous dissent, that public utilities are a 
"sharing of responsibility between the ratepayers and the share-
holders."102 The commission placed heavy emphasis on the 
utilities' "service obligation," a legal requirement in New York 
that utilities must provide efficient and adequate electrical ser-
vice.103 
New York is not alone in granting full recovery of cancellation 
costsy14 For example, North Carolina's Public Service Commission 
(NCPSC), acting within its discretionary authority, permitted 
Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO) to recover losses 
of its North Anna 4 facility through an operating expense amorti-
zation, and in the ratebase as a component of working capital.105 
While following New York by categorizing the loss as a cost of 
service,I06 the NCPSC granted only partial rate base treatment of 
the unamortized portion by making a distinction between the 
senior capital shareholder and the investor of common equity.107 
The commission ruled that because senior capital shareholders 
were only associated with the cancelled facility through their 
original investment, the utility should recover all capital costs in 
the rate base.lOs As to the common equity shareholder, who could 
actually influence the entities' day to day policies, the commission 
was less sympathetic and denied certain components of the 
ratebaseYl9 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
IO~ I d. at 412. 
103 I d. at 39l. 
104 PLANT CANCELLATIONS, supra note 1, at 49; PIERCE, supra note 10, at 518 n.119; A 
Survey of Regulatory Treatment of Plant Cancellation Cost, 111 PUB. UTIL. FORT. (Mar. 
31, 1983) 52. 
105 Re Virginia Electric & Power Co., 48 PUB. UTIL. REP. 4th (PUR) 327 (1982). 
106 I d. at 346. 
107 Id. at 347. 
108 Id. 
1119 Id. 
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While reaching a similar result, N ew York and North Carolina 
have different regulatory philosophies. New York embraces the 
argument that utilities should be granted full recovery because 
state law requires them to meet their service obligation efficiently 
and adequately, and nuclear power is a response to that require-
ment. The North Carolina Commission has rejected this ap-
proach, and instead treats recovery as an equitable issue, with 
emphasis on the degree to which each investing party partici-
pates in the flawed investmentYo 
B. Partial Recovery 
A majority of state jurisdictions,lll along with the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission,ll2 grant partial recovery. While 
apportionment schemes vary considerably,l13 the distribution of 
losses is based on the widely recognized regulatory concept that 
the operation of a public utility involves risks and controls that 
must be shared equally by investors and consumersY4 
This "joint venture" approach to apportioning losses can be 
found in Re Boston Edison Company,115 Boston Edison Company's 
1981 rate case before the Massachusetts Department of Public 
Utilities (DPU). In 1971, Boston Edison Company (BE CO) made 
110 Full recovery of cancellation costs, as demonstrated in Re Rochester Gas & E. Corp., 
is not without controversy. At least one commentator attacks the approach as an 
incentive to the utility to behave contrary to the public interest. It is argued that full 
recovery allows the utility to earn a favorable rate of return irrespective of the wisdom of 
the investment. Moreover, in many cases, an incentive is created to cancel plants that 
would otherwise benefit the consumer, since commissions often impose penalties for 
excess capacity; in this circumstance, economic benefits are greater than completion 
costs. PIERCE, supra note 10, at 542. 
An alternative view applauds New York's full recovery approach on the basis that in 
some circumstances, cost apportionment preserves a favorable market for utility stock 
and prevents the cost of capital from rising. Robinson, Utility Fiascoes-Who Shauld 
Pay?, 108 PuB. UTIL. FORT. (Dec. 17, 1983) 17, 19-20. 
111 For a list of state jurisdictions which have granted partial recovery, see PLANT 
CANCELLATIONS, supra note 1, at 44-45. 
112 For an illustration of apportionment under the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission,see Northern States Power Co., [1979-1982 Transfer Binder] UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) 
11 12,516, at 15,987 (F.E.R.C. 1981). 
113 PLANT CANCELLATIONS, supra note 1, at 43-48. 
114 Pierce argues that apportioning the loss between the consumer and the investor by, 
for example, allowing the utility to recover out of pocket expenses but denying a portion 
of the cost of capital, "create[s] the proper incentive for plant investment." PIERCE, supra 
note 10, at 543. Pierce provides a thorough analysis of both legal and economic issues 
confronting regulators of the nuclear industry. 
115 Re Boston Edison Co., 46 PUB. UTIL. REP. 4th (PUR) 431, appeal aif'd, Attorney 
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the decision to construct a second nuclear facility, Pilgrim II, in 
Plymouth, Massachusetts,116 While Pilgrim II had a number of 
investors,1l7 BECO owned approximately 59% of its stockU8 
Throughout the 1970's, BECO's construction was plagued by 
financial uncertainty,U9 regulatory lag,t20 and decreased use of 
energy,121 Financial analysts lowered the company's bond rat-
ings,t22 sending BECO's financial stability into question.l23 In 1977, 
the construction was further hampered by regulatory delays from 
the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board;l24 it was not until the 
beginning of 1980 that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
granted BECO a construction permit.125 By that time, the pro-
jected completion cost of Pilgrim II grew to $3.22 billion.126 Despite 
the company's commitment to build Pilgrim II in the midst of 
regulatory delays and inflated costs, the project was cancelled on 
September 23, 1981.127 The utility immediately appealed to the 
DPU for full recovery of its $278 million loss.128 
Acting under its broad discretionary authority,t29 the DPU 
found that cancellation losses required "separate, independent 
and unique rules that properly reflect the just balance of the 
affected interests."l30 The commission divided the costs between 
the utility investor and the consuming public by permitting re-
covery of all costs prudently incurred. All expenditures occurring 
after June, 1980 were disallowed on the basis that it was then that 
"project uncertainty had become intolerably high" and cancella-
General v. Department of Public Utilities, 390 Mass. Adv. Sheets 208, 455 N.E.2d 414 
(1983). 
116 Re Boston Edison Co., 46 PUR 4th at 433. 
J17 [d. 
118 [d. 
119 [d. at 462-70 . 
• 20 [d . 
••• [d . 
••• -This factor was emphasized in the Supreme Judicial Court's opinion in Attorney 
General v. Department of Public Utilities, 390 Mass. Adv. Sheets 208, 229, 455 N .E.2d 414, 
426 (1983) . 
••• [d . 
• 24 Re Boston Edison, 46 PUR 4th at 463. 
,.5 [d. at 469 . 
• 26 [d. 
'27 390 Mass. Adv. Sheets at 210, 455 N.E.2d at 415 . 
•• 8 Re Boston Edison, 46 PUR 4th at 434. 
'29 The Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities acts under the authority of 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 94 (West 1976) . 
• 30 Re Boston Edison Co., 46 PUR 4th at 435. 
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tion would have been prudent.l31 Those costs made before June of 
1980 were recovered through the rate structure over a 13 year 
amortization period.132 
Several considerations contributed to DPU's decision to reject 
the exclusion of all investments not "used and usefuL" First, 
DPU's apportionment scheme was widely shared by other state 
regulatory agencies facing the issue of extraordinary utility los-
ses.133 Second, the DPU found compelling the magnitude of BE-
CO's investment and the potentially harmful effects of complete 
denial of recovery on the company's ability to provide adequate 
service.134 The agency noted that the loss represented 25% of the 
company's permanently invested capital,l35 DPU regulations pre-
vented the recovery of CWIP or AFUDC costs until the comple-
tion of the project.136 Thus, BECO was faced with the prospect of 
writing off the entire $278 million as a loss. The consequences of 
such a loss would be, according to the DPU, quite dramatic. With 
such a result, an investment in BECO would be viewed as too 
high a risk, and the company would be threatened by insufficient 
capital. In short, the financial consequences were considered "in-
evitable and devastating."l37 The agency accepted BECO's gloomy 
scenario of loss of earnings, lower bond ratings, and the increased 
cost of capital. The financial instability described by BECO was, in 
the opinion of DPU, "acute enough to give us great pause."l38 
131 Id. at 470. 
13" Id. at 473. While allowing certain prudent costs to be recovered through the rate 
base, the DPU did not allow recovery of the equity rate of return portion of AFUDC, 
which was denied on the basis of regulatory precedent. 
133 46 PUR 4th at 435. 
134 The Department emphasized that "the ability of the company to meet its service 
obligation in an adequate fashion must be, we submit, the prior and controlling consid-
eration here." Re Boston Edison Co., 46 PUR 4th at 460. 
135 Id. at 456. 
136 Id. at 471. The reasons for excluding the equity portion of the AFUDC were put 
forth by the Department: "We are convinced by the company's argument that the 
shareholder will never realize a return on his investment as found appropriate by the 
department, if the scales are 'perpetually tipped' toward the ratepayers. A 'good faith' 
decision to invest funds in construction projects is not a sufficient ground to guarantee a 
return on an ultimately failed investment." 
137 Id. at 459. 
136 Id. The DPU was unwilling to accept the opinion of Commissioner Sprague, whose 
lone dissent emphasized the application of the used and useful approach to ratemaking. 
Sprague, in asserting the used and useful argument, was unconvinced that the con-
sumer should share in the financial risks of the investor: "In our free enterprise system, 
it is a fundamental business principle that the owners of a corporation benefit when a 
corporate strategy creates profits, but bear the burden when funds are expended on 
ventures that fail." Id. at 479. 
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On appeal in Attorney General v. Department of Public Utilities, 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found that the DPU 
was within its statutory authority to reject the used and useful 
approach.139 The court found no compelling reason to alter its 
practice of showing judicial deference to utility rate-making.140 
Judicial deference, however, did not prevent the court from com-
menting on the agency's decision. In upholding the order, the 
court noted with approval DPU's concern for preserving investor 
confidence in the utility industry.141 In fact, the court agreed that 
disallowing recovery might pose a "serious threat to the com-
pany's integrity.m42 
Massachusetts illustrates how one jurisdiction grants ratebase 
treatment of cancelled nuclear project losses.143 In Re Boston 
Edison Co., the commission applied a prudence standard in divid-
ing costs between the consumer and the investor. The Commis-
sion refused to saddle the consumer with imprudent business 
decisions; however, a concern for financial stability and the con-
tinued service obligation made apportionment of prudent invest-
ment losses inevitable. 
C. Complete Denial of Cancellation Costs 
In Ohio, Oregon, Wyoming, and Washington, utilities are often 
denied any recovery of cancellation costS.144 In OffICe of Consum-
ers' Counsel v. Public Utilities Commission,14.5 for example, the 
Ohio Supreme Court reversed a commission order granting rate 
recovery of the cancellation costs associated with four nuclear 
facilities.146 The court construed Ohio law as prohibiting recovery 
139 Attorney General v. Department of Public Utilities, 390 Mass. Adv. Sheets at 228, 
455 N.E.2d at 425. 
140 ld. 
141 390 Mass. Adv. Sheets at 229, 455 N.E.2d at 426. 
1., As the court stressed, "investor confidence is not an insignificant element in utility 
regulation. A judgement that the adverse consequence of disallowing of recovery would 
be a serious threat to the company's integrity, and indirectly to its customers, was 
warranted." ld. 
143 See PIERCE, supra note 10, at 518-19. Pierce notes that other commissions apply the 
"used and useful" approach when dividing costs. Unlike Massachusetts, other jurisdic-
tions assume the decision to invest is prudent, but deny investors a return on the cost of 
capital. Therefore, the utility recovers all operating expenses.ld. at 518-19. 
144 See PIERCE, supra note 10, at 519 n.128-129. 
14.> 67 O.O.3d 96, 423 N.E.2d 820 (1981). 
146 See infra text and notes at notes 217-22. 
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of investments that fail to provide service, since the cost failed to 
meet the definition of operating expenses.147 
In other jurisdictions, legislative denials of recovery are more 
explicit. In Pacific Power & Light Company,t48 Oregon law pre-
vented the utility from recovering costs in the cancelled Pebble 
Springs and WPPSS No.5 nuclear facilities.149 In Wyoming, a 
similar statutory provision prevented the commission from allow-
ing recovery of the failed WPPSS 4 & 5 and Pebble Springs 
facilities. l50 
Administrative discretion can also result in complete denial. In 
Washington, for example, the Pacific Power & Light Company's 
request for recovery of their losses in Pebble Springs and WPPSS 
was rejected.l5l The commission reasoned that other regulatory 
bodies with jurisdiction over the cancelled facilities had already 
granted favorable treatment. Allowing further rate relief would 
result in double recovery.152 
A survey of state and federal treatment of cancellation costs 
associated with nuclear projects indicates that complete denial or 
complete recovery is rare. More common is the division of costs 
between utility investors and consumers. When state law pre-
vents any recovery associated with a cancelled facility, a utility 
can assert that exclusion of such costs prevents the utility inves-
tor from earning a reasonable rate of return. It is argued that the 
147 ld. 
148 49 PuB. UTIL. REP. 4th (PUR) 82 (Or. Puc. 1982); see also American Bar Association, 
1983 Annual Report, Section of Public Utilities Law 83. 
149 OR. REV. STAT. § 5 Ch. 757, 355 (1979) provides: "[N]o public utility shall, directly or 
indirectly, by any device, charge, demand, collect or receive from a ratebase which 
includes within it any construction, building, installation, or real or personal property 
not presently used for providing utility service to the customer." 
150 Lower Valley & Light Inc., No. 9617-sub 11, at 9 (Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wyo., 
Dec. 2, 1982). Wyoming law instructs the regulatory commission to include only "the 
property and business of any public utility used and useful." 
151 Washington Utils. & Transp. Comm'n v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 51 PuB. UTIL. 
REP. 4th (PUR) 158 (Wash. Utils. and Transp. Confm'n, 1983). See also People's Orgn. For 
Wash. v. State of Washington Util., 101 Wash. 2d 425, 679 P.2d 922 (1984). There, the 
Washington Supreme Court held that a statute empowering the commission to deter-
mine fair value for rate-making purposes for property used and useful to consumers did 
not allow inclusion in the ratebase for cancellation of two nuclear facilities. The court 
held that the uncompleted facilities were not used and useful to the public and, there-
fore, the commission could not grant ratebase treatment for CWIP costs. 
1" 51 PUR at 168. It should be noted that other jurisdictions have totally denied rate 
relief in certain unique circumstances. See, e.g., Arizona Pub. Servo Co., 38 PuB. UTIL. 
REP. 4th (PUR) 547, 556 (Arizona Corp. Comm'n 1980); Northern States Power Co., 42 
PuB. UTIL. REP. 4th (PUR) 339, 360-64 (Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 1981). 
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state has confiscated property in violation of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments to the United States Constitution. 
IV. RATE-MAKING AND THE CONFISCATION DOCTRINE 
While state and federal regulatory agencies are not uniform in 
their apportionment of losses, each rate-setting order must con-
form to constitutional standards. The Takings Clause of the fifth 
amendment, and by incorporation the fourteenth amendment, 
provides that no private property shall be taken by government 
without just compensation.153 Within the context of the govern-
ment's regulation of utility rates, this clause is referred to as the 
confiscation doctrine.154 This section first traces the development 
of the Takings Clause in the general area of government regula-
tion. Judicial review of public utility regulation is then analyzed. 
Government's regulation of private property does not immedi-
ately rise to the level of a taking in which just compensation is 
due.155 As stated in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,156 it is only 
when regulators have gone "too far [that] it will be recognized as 
a taking."157 While state and federal courts have disagreed on 
what constitutes "too far,"158 the prevailing model in takings law 
is the "diminution in value" theory.159 Under this approach, the 
Court focuses on the extent of economic harm. The Court exam-
ines the impairment of the owner's right to profit from her prop-
erty. If the value is "severely reduced," a taking has occurred and 
compensation must follow.1OO The exercise of judicial review of 
rate-setting orders roughly follows this economic diminution 
modeJ.161 However, before discussing the Supreme Court's con-
153 Specifically, the relevant language of the fifth amendment provides that "prop-
erty [shall not] be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S.CONST. amend V. 
The Takings Clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution applies to 
the states through the due procesi'l clause of the fourteenth amendment. Webb's Fabul-
ous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980). 
154 See infra text and notes at notes 172-75. 
155 Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135,155-57 (1921); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523-39 
(1934). • 
156 260 U.S. 412 (1922). 
157 Id. at 415. 
158 Compare State of Maine v. Johnson,. 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970) (private property 
subject to state wetlands control board is a taking without just compensation) with Just 
v. Marinette County, 56 Wis.2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) (not an unconstitutional taking 
when owner is prevented from filling in marshland). The United States Supreme Court 
has not been entirely consistent or clear on the subject. See Plater, The Takings Issue in 
a National Setting: Floodlines and the Police Power, 52 TEx. L. REV. 201, 252 (1974). 
159 Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 151-55 (1971). 
160 Id. 
161 See infra text and notes at notes 202-05. 
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temporary treatment of constitutional law and public utilities, a 
brief legal history will reveal that the Court has not always 
exercised substantive judicial review in the area of government 
regulation. 
The scope of the fifth and fourteenth amendments became 
controversial in the 1800's, when federal and state governments 
recognized the need to regulate certain businesses affecting the 
public interest. One common form of regulation was the setting of 
rates which, as the United States Supreme Court ruled in Munn v. 
Illinois,162 was not a taking. The issue before the Court in Munn 
was the constitutionality of an Illinois statute requiring grain 
elevator operators to obtain licenses and abide by certain rate 
limitations.l63 The owners of one grain elevator asserted that the 
statute was invalidated by the fourteenth amendment's proscrip-
tion against government deprivation of property without com-
pensation.164 In rejecting the argument, the Court explained why 
property "affected with a public interest"165 could be regulated. 
The Court described'the power to regulate certain commerce as a 
power "inherent in every sovereignty.m66 Following the tradition 
of English common law, the Court ruled that when "private prop-
erty is affected with a public interest," it can no longer be consid-
ered entirely "private.m67 Property becomes imbued with this 
public interest when, according to the Court, "[it is] used in a 
manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the commu-
nity at large.m68 Without deciding which property fell within the 
definition of public interest, the Court found that because the 
grain warehouses were a "gateway of commerce" under which all 
grain shippers passed, the plaintiff's business was "clothed with a 
public interest.m69 
The Court in Munn went beyond affirming the power of a state 
to regulate certain property by rate-making. It also ruled that the 
legislature was to be given substantial deference in setting those 
162 94 U,S. 113 (1876). 
163 [d. at 115. "An act to regulate public warehouses and the warehousing and inspec-
tion of grain, and to give effect to art. 13 of the Constitution of this State," approved April 
25, 1871. 
164 [d. at 119-22. 
165 [d. at 130. 
166 [d. at 125. 
167 [d. at 126. 
166 [d. 
169 [d. at 132. 
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rates. Because the function of determining rates was legislative 
in nature, it was not the Court's role to "fix a maximum beyond 
which any charge made would be unreasonable."170 Acknowledg-
ing that this rate-making power could be abused, the Court be-
lieved that the legislature was the only proper forum for the 
setting of rates. The Court advised private property owners seek-
ing protection against unreasonable rates "to resort to the polls, 
not to the courts."l7l 
In the years following Munn, the Court took a closer look at the 
constitutional parameters of rate-making. While continuing to 
acknowledge that rate-making was within the proper exercise of 
the police power, the Court developed a judicial role in the rate-
making process. Presented with a state regulation of railroad 
rates, the Court, in Stone v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. ,172 declared 
that rate-making must be reasonable: "[The] power to regulate is 
not a power to destroy, and limitation is not the equivalent of 
confiscation. Under pretense of regulatory fares and freights, the 
state cannot require a railroad corporation to carry persons or 
property without reward; neither can it do that which in law 
amounts to a taking of private property without just compensa-
tion, or without due process of law."173 The Court in Stone sug-
gested that the issue of reasonableness could only be answered 
conclusively by the judiciary, with reference to the fifth and 
fourteenth amendments.174 This standard of reasonableness, de-
veloped in later decisions, became recognized as an element of the 
confiscation doctrine.175 
By the end of the 19th century, the Court had several oppor-
tunities to emphasize and articulate its substantive role in the 
regulatory process. In Chicago M & St. PRy. Co. v. Minnesota, 176 
for example, the Court struck down as unconstitutional a Min-
nesota statute delegating to a railroad and warehouse commis-
170 [d. at 133-34. 
171 [d. at 134. 
172 116 U.S. 307 (1886). 
173 [d. at 331. 
174 [d. See Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Federal Power Commission v. 
Natural Gas Pipeline, Inc., 315 U.S. 575, 609 (1942): "[W]hile the doctrine of 'confiscation,' 
as a limitation to be enforced by the judiciary upon the legislative power to fix utility 
rates, was first applied in Chicago M & St. P. Ry Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, that 
decision followed principles, expounded in Stone v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 116 U.S. 
307. Mr. Justice Waite, who decided the opinion in the Stone case as well as the earlier 
decision in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S.113, was therefore the author of the doctrine of 
confiscation, and its corolary, judicial review." 
175 [d. 
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sion the final, unreviewable authority in setting rates. Relying on 
Stone, the Court emphasized that the power to regulate is not 
without limit, and any statute which prevents the-judiciary from 
considering reasonableness must fall.177 
In Covington & Lexington Turnpike Co. v. Sandford, the Court 
held unconstitutional a Kentucky statute reducing the level of 
tolls collected by a turnpike owner.178 Accepting the state's asser-
tion that "it is not the province of the courts to enter upon the 
merely administrative duty of framing a tariff of rates for car-
riage,"179 the Court emphasized its responsibility to determine 
when such rates deprived individuals of their property rights. In 
Covington, the tolls were so great a financial imposition on the 
company that roads could not be maintained and dividends could 
not be distributed to shareholdersYj() What began as a valid exer-
cise of the police power became an invalid taking of private prop-
erty. 
Finally, in Smyth v. Ames, the Court held that a Nebraska 
statute regulating the rate of rail freight deprived companies of 
just compensation.181 The Court found that the basis for all rate 
calculations was the fair value of property used by the public.182 
The costs of construction, improvements, stocks and bonds, prob-
able earning capacity, and operating expenses were considered 
important components of the calculation.l83 The Court in Smyth v. 
Ames emphasized a balanced relationship between the regulated 
investor and the consumer: "What the company is entitled to ask 
is a fair return upon the value of that which it employs for the 
public convenience," while the public cannot demand more than 
the regulated enterprise is worth.184 
Between Munn and its decision in Smyth v. Ames, the Court 
developed constitutional standards for reviewing the regulation 
of public utilities. While the state could set rates for businesses 
imbued with the public interest, the reasonableness of these rates 
was not, as the dissenting justice in Munn v. Illinois feared, "at 
176 134 U.S. 418 (1890). 
177 Id. at 455-56. 
178 164 U.S. 578 (1896). 
179 Id. at 593. 
;80 Id. at 595. 
181 169 U.S. 468 (1898). 
1", I d. at 546. 
18.'1 Id. at 547. 
184 Id. 
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the mercy of a majority of [the] legislature."I&'; Exactly when the 
imposition of regulation became unreasonable was, of course, a 
difficult legal issue. While Covington and Smyth v. Ames sug-
gested that reasonableness was linked to the continued success of 
the company to maintain services and attract investors, it was 
not until the 20th century that the Court fully developed the 
concept of confiscation. 
In Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co./86 the 
Court addressed whether the federal government's rate-setting of 
a natural gas utility company was unreasonable and thus a 
confiscation of property in violation of the fifth amendment. Jus-
tice Douglas, writing for the majority, emphasized the concept of 
judicial deference found in earlier opinions.187 The Court recog-
nized that "under the statutory standard of just and reasonable it 
is the result reached not the method employed which is control-
ling."I88 Justice Douglas then proceeded to the constitutional 
question of "reasonableness." The adjusting of rates, wrote Jus-
tice Douglas, "involve[d] a balancing of the investor and consumer 
interests."189 Financial integrity of the company was viewed as a 
"legitimate concern,"l90 since "it is important that there be 
enough revenue not only for operating expenses but also for the 
capital costs of the business."191 The Court then expanded on the 
concept of revenue requirements: "The return to the equity 
owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in 
other enterprises having corresponding risks. That return, more-
over, should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial 
integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to 
attract capital."192 This "financial integrity" test provides a stan-
dard for assessing whether a rate-making scheme has deprived 
public utilities of their constitutional protections against confisca-
tion.19:3 
'"" 94 U.S. 140 (1876). 
"'; 320 u.s. 591 (1944). 
"7 Justice Douglas noted with approval the FPC v. Natural Gas concept of judicial 
deference, stating "under the statutory standard of just and reasonable it is the result 
reached not the method employed which is controlling." Hope further recognized that 
the Commission's determination has a "presumption of validity," and that a challenger 
to a ratemaking order has to overcome a "heavy burden of making a convincing showing 
that it is invalid because it is unjust and unreasonable in its consequences." Id. at 602. 
'KH Id. at 602. 
1K" Id. at 603. 
'!H'ld. 
"" Id. 
"" ld. 
"'3 See in/ret text and notes at notes 202-05. 
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Since the Hope opinion in 1944, the Court has had few occasions 
to comment extensively on the confiscation doctrine and public 
utilities. In Permian Basin Area Rate Cases/94 the Federal Power 
Commission prescribed rates for natural gas production. The 
commission's rate scheme was attacked as confiscatory. On the 
basis of Hope, the Court was unwilling to strike down the rate-
making as unconstitutional. The Court concluded that the Com-
mission followed the lessons gained from Hope by properly balanc-
ing investor and consumer interests. The Court in Permian, how-
ever, did not emphasize the "financial integrity" test; rather, it 
declared that the rates fell within a "broad zone of reasonable-
ness."195 
The significance of the Court's "broad zone of reasonableness" 
approach in Permian is not widely agreed upon.196 According to 
one commentator, the decision marks the Court's retreat to 
Munn, when the judiciary exercised no substantial review over 
rate-making.w7 It is argued that with Permian, the Court im-
plicitly conceded that "the Constitution no longer provides any 
special protection for the utility investor."198 As a result, it is 
asserted that the Court has "abandoned even the limited scope of 
substantive review of rates that it retained in Hope." 199 An alter-
native analysis rejects this reading of Permian as a substantive 
change in the Court's level of judicial review?)j) According to this 
view, Permian merely repeats the Hope requirement of insuring 
financial integrity through a fair rate of return of capitaPOl 
An historical analysis of confiscation and public utilities sug-
gests a progression from legislative hegemony to substantive 
judicial review. Beginning with almost complete deference to the 
legislature in Munn, the Court recognized the judiciary's proper 
role in rate-making with Stone, Covington, and Smyth v. Ames. 
The standard of judicial review, and the articulation of the 
confiscation doctrine, were further advanced with Hope and Per-
'9< 390 U.S. 747 (1968). 
,% [d. at 770. 
'''" Compare Bernstein, Utility Rate Regulation: The !Attie Locomotive That Couldn't 
WASH. L. Q. 223, 259-60 (1978), with Liberman, Normalized Taxes in Utility Rates: Giving 
Credit Where None are Due, 30 S. C. L. REV. 703, 766 (1979). 
'97 BERNSTEIN, supra note 196, at 259-60. 
'"" [d. 
'99 [d. at 258 (quoting 390 U.S. at 791-92). 
")0 LIBERMAN, supra note 196, at 705. 
,'0) [d. at 766. 
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mian. Absent an abrupt change in the Court's analysis, the 
confiscation doctrine as applied to public utilities involves four 
fundamental principles. A challenger to a rate order carries the 
heavy burden of demonstrating that the order is invalid because 
it is unjust and unreasonable in its consequences.202 Secondly, the 
commission's action will be safe from constitutional attack pro-
vided the order falls within a "broad zone of reasonableness."203 
As a third principle, the constitution does not bind regulators to 
anyone single formula or combination of formulas.204 Finally, 
confiscation will not occur if rates are high enough to "assure 
confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to 
maintain its credit and attract capital."205 
In recent years, these principles have been used by utilities and 
consumer groups in arguing the proper apportionment of losses 
associated with cancelled nuclear facilities.206 While the United 
States Supreme Court has not taken the opportunity to comment 
extensively on confiscation in the context of cancelled nuclear 
facilities, the confiscation doctrine has been frequently discussed 
at the state level. 
V. THE CONFISCATION DOCTRINE AND THE OHIO SUPREME 
COURT 
With the increasing cancellation of nuclear projects, state 
courts have settled the issue of apportionment by reference to the 
confiscation doctrine. In Ohio, where the construction of two nu-
clear facilities was terminated prior to completion, the state su-
preme court applied state law to prevent any recovery. This pros-
cription prompted a constitutional challenge by utilities, and the 
request was a dramatic and arguably flawed application of the 
Hope "financial integrity" test. After a brief history of the termi-
nation of Ohio's nuclear facilities, the article analyzes the Ohio 
Supreme Court's interpretation of state law and constitutional 
doctrine in Cleveland Electric Illuminating v. PuMic Utilities 
Commission of Ohio. 207 An analysis of the appeal to the United 
States Supreme Court will follow, along with a critique of the 
'"" Hope, 320 U.S. at 602. 
203 Permian, 390 U.S. at 770. 
W4 Hope, 320 U.S. at 602. 
,>(" Id. at 603. 
"'6 See infra text and notes at notes 223-25. 
"07 Consumers Counsel v. Pub. Uti!. Comm., 67 O.O.3d 96,97,423 N.E.2d 820, 821 (1981). 
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decision and a discussion of the constitutional parameters of ap-
portionment through legislative reform. 
In 1973, the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (CEI), in 
conjunction with other utilities commonly referred to as the Cen-
tral Area Power Coordination Group (CAPCO), began the con-
struction of four nuclear generating facilities-Davis Besse Units 
2 and 3 and Erie Units 1 and 2.208 
Like nuclear development nationwide, lower consumer demand 
and increased regulatory control throughout the 1970's dampened 
CAPCO's optimism for the project.209 The Arab Oil Embargo of 
1973 forced CAPCO consumers to conserve electricity, thus de-
creasing the demand for additional sources of energy.210 Moreover, 
the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island had a disasterous effect on 
the company.211 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued new 
design requirements for plants of the design used by CAPCO, 
causing additional delays and cost overruns.212 By January of 
1980, CAPCO made the decision to terminate the entire project.213 
Prior to cancellation, CAPCO had spent $246 million on the 
planning and construction of the facilities. CEI had lost $56.4 
million in the project, and in February of 1980 the utility appealed 
to the Public Utility Commission of Ohio (PUCO) for a rate in-
crease to recover the investment. In Re Cleveland Electric Il-
luminating Co., the commission granted recovery by categorizing 
the losses as current operating expenses, with amortization over 
a 10 year period.214 
Accepting CEl's request, PUCO relied on Ohio law, which em-
powers PUCO to determine "the cost of the utility in rendering 
the public utility service for the test period.m15 The commission 
refused to construe the statute in a manner that would limit 
recovery of operating expenses to property "used and useful" to 
the public. Instead, PUCO declared that Ohio law gave the agency 
authority to allow the utility to recoup the losses through a rate 
increase. In its order, PUCO applied the standard that "if the 
expenditures are prudent, amortization should be permitted."216 
208 Id. 
:!O!J Id. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. 
213 PUB. UTIL. REP. 4th (PUR) 494 (Ohio Pub. Util. Comm'n, July 10, 1980). 
214 Id. 
215 Omo REV. CODE § 4909.15 (A)(4) (Baldwin 1983). 
216 Re Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, 38 PuB. UTIL. REP. 4th (PUR) at 526. 
/\ 
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On appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court in Consumers Counsel v. 
Public Utilities Commission ("Cleveland"),217 a number of citizens 
groups and the City of Cleveland challenged the administrative 
order. Specifically, the plaintiffs focused on whether PUCO could 
lawfully permit the utility to treat its investment in the four 
cancelled plants as amortizable costS.218 It was argued that Ohio 
law mandates recovery of current operating expenses, and that 
while a majority of jurisdictions permit recovery, PUCO is not 
permitted to look beyond state law. In short, the Ohio General 
Assembly intended that no recovery should be permitted.2lg The 
court analyzed the statutory language and agreed with appel-
lants that the prudence standard should not be applied. Noting 
that Ohio law allows the normal, recurring expenses of the 
utility, the court refused to permit CEl's "extraordinary loss" to 
"be transformed into an ordinary operating expense pursuant to 
section 4909.15 (A)(4) by Commission fiat."22o Denying cost recov-
ery and reversing PUCO's order, the court recognized that the 
loss could cause financial uncertainty.221 This threat, however, did 
not "imbue the commission with the authority to rewrite the 
statutes."222 
The utility sought rehearing of Cleveland I on the basis that the 
prohibition against the recoupment of cancellation costs under 
section 4909.15(A)(4) constituted a confiscation of private property 
in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the 
United States Constitution.223 Because Ohio law requires every 
public utility to meet a service obligation/24 the utility argued that 
the construction of the plants was in response to this obligation. 
Thus, when the facilities failed, the utilities were entitled to re-
coup their losses either as a component of the rate base or as 
operating expenses. The failure of the Ohio General Assembly to 
accommodate CEl's losses meant that the state was requiring the 
construction of the facility, and then preventing a reasonable 
return on the investment.225 
m 67 O.O.3d 96, 97, 423 N.E.2d 820, 821. 
"" 67 O.O.3d at 102, 423 N.E.2d at 826. 
"" 67 O.O.3d at 103, 423 N.E.2d at 827. 
"0 [d. 
'" 67 O.O.3d at lOp, 423 N.E.2d at 828-29. 
'" [d. 
"3 Reh'g denied, No. 80-1528, September 1, 1981. 
'" See Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4905.22 (Baldwin 1983). 
'" See infra text at note 242. 
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The Ohio Supreme Court refused to address the constitutional 
issue and denied the rehearing.226 CEl's subsequent appeal of 
Cleveland I to the United States Supreme Court was dismissed on 
the procedural basis of a want of a properly presented federal 
question.227 Because subsequent rate adjustments continued to 
involve the losses associated with the cancellation of the plants, 
CEI was able to assert its constitutional claim before both PUCO 
and the Ohio Supreme Court.22R In October of 1981, PUCO consid-
ered the same expenditures at issue in Cleveland I. Mandated by 
that decision, the commission denied recovery.229 
In a second rate proceeding which also involved cancellation 
costs, the utility again failed to recover losses in the cancelled 
plants. PUCO, though sympathetic to the utility, was constrained 
by Cleveland I's ruling that such losses could not be categorized as 
operating expenses.230 
In Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company v. Public Utilities 
Commission of Ohio ("Cleveland II"), CEI once more appealed the 
order to the Ohio Supreme Court, which finally examined the 
merits of the constitutional argument.231 After dismissing the 
utility's request for a reconsideration of the court's statutory 
interpretation of section 4909. 15(A)( 4) in Cleveland I, the court 
addressed the issue of whether the proscription against recovery 
of cancellation costs was an unconstitutional confiscation of prop-
erty without just compensation.232 The court found controlling its 
earlier pronouncement in Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Public 
Utilities Commission of Ohio, where a utility unsuccessfully 
sought the recovery of costs associated with its coal fired generat-
ing unit.233 In reviewing the history of the confiscation doctrine 
226 See Ohio Supreme Court, rehearing denied, Case nos. 80-1347,80-1528,80-1480 (Sept. 
1, 1981). 
22' Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. v. Office of Consumers Counsel, 455 U.S. 914 
(1982). 
22M The complex appellate process of CEl's constitutional claim is summarized in Cleve. 
Elec. IlIum. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 4 Ohio 3d 107, 447 N.E.2d 746 (1983). 
229 Opinion and Order of the Ohio Public Utilities Commission, Case No. 81-1096-EL-
COL CEI appealed the order to the Ohio Supreme Court, which was dismissed without 
opinion in Cleve. Elec. IlIum. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., Case No. 82-165. On appeal, the 
United States Supreme Court dismissed the case for want of a properly presented 
federal question. 459 U.S. 1094 (1983). 
230 Opinion and Order of the Ohio Public Utilities Commission, Case No. 81-146-EL-
AIR. 
231 4 Ohio St. 3d 107,447 N.E.2d 746 (1983). 
232 4 Ohio St. 3d at 109, 447 N.E.2d at 748. 
:2.'l3 4 Ohio St. 3d 91, 447 N.E.2d 733 (1983). 
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and public utilities, Dayton was particularly influenced by one 
commentator's reading of Permian. According to this view, a 
"broad zone of reasonableness" was an implicit suggestion by the 
Court that "the Constitution no longer provides any special pro-
tection for the utility investor."234 Dayton embraced this analysis, 
noting that since Permian, the United States Supreme Court has 
continually rejected constitutional claims of confiscatory rate or-
ders.235 These rejections stemmed from procedural infirmities,236 
or for want of a substantial federal question.237 As to the latter, 
the Court has determined that no constitutional claim exists 
without issuing a full opinion.238 
Thus, the court in Cleveland II found Dayton's rejection of the 
constitutional argument controlling. It was concluded that section 
4909.15(A)(4), by disallowing the loss of cancellation, does not vio-
late the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States 
Constitution. For a third and final time, CEI appealed the Ohio 
decision to the United States Supreme Court. 
On appeal, CEI argued that the Ohio Supreme Court misun-
derstood the meaning of Hope and Permian.239 Appellants con-
tended that although Hope rejected the idea that the constitution 
imposed methodological strictures on the state, the decision did 
not indicate a return to the Munn v. Illinois standard of legisla-
tive hegemony and complete lack of judicial review. The Supreme 
234 4 Ohio St. 3d at 99, 447 N.E.2d at 740. 
235 4 Ohio St. 3d at 100, 447 N.E.2d at 740. 
236 See supra text and notes at notes 226-27. 
237 See generally Appalachian Power Co. v. West Virginia Pub. Service Comm'n. (W. Va. 
Oct. 10, 1977), unreported, appeal dismissed (1978), 435 U.S. 901, 98 S. Ct. 1444,55 L.Ed. 2d 
492; South Central Bell Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Servo Comm'n. (La. 1977), 352 So. 2d 
964, appeal dismissed 437 U.S. 911 (1978); California Ass'n of Utility Shareholders v. 
California Pub. Servo Comm'n. (Cal. July 19, 1979), unreported, appeal dismissed 444 U.S. 
986 (1979); C & SOE V. Pub. Util. Comm'n., 64 Ohio St. 2d 175,413 N.E.2d 1208, appeal 
dismissed, 452 U.S. 933 (1980). 
236 There is some disagreement over the significance of a dismissal of an appeal from a 
state court for want of a substantial federal question. United States ex rei. Epton v. 
Nenna, 318 F. Supp. 899, 906 n.8(S.D.N.Y. 1970),aff'd 446 F.2d 363, 366(2d Cir.1971),cert. 
denied, 404 U.S. 948. However, both commentators and courts generally follow Justice 
Brennan's remarks in Ohio ex reI. Eaton V. Price, 360 U.S. 246 (1959), that "votes to affirm 
summary judgement, and to dismiss for want of a substantial federal question, it hardly 
needs comment, are votes on the merits of the case." [d. at 257. See generally R. STERN & 
E. GROSSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 322 (5th ed. 1978); Hicks V. Miranda, 422 U.S. 
332, 343-45 (1975). 
239 Appellant's Reply Brief Opposing the Motion to Dismiss or Affirm, Cleveland 
Electric Illuminating Co. V. Public Utilities of Ohio, 104 S. Ct. 47 (1983). 
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Court rejected the appeal for want of a substantial federal ques-
tion.240 
There is considerable doubt whether Ohio's interpretation of 
the constitution gains support in the case law. While Permian 
stresses the highly deferential nature of judicial review of 
rate-making appeals, the Court is careful to remind regulatory 
commissions that "pertinent constitutional limitations" do 
exist.241 Among these limitations is the confiscation doctrine. As 
articulated through Hope, the doctrine involves the assurance 
that rates are high enough to insure successful operation, main-
tain financial integrity, attract capital, and compensate investors 
for their risks.242 Rather than adopt Hope as the proper standard, 
the court in Dayton and Cleveland II reduced the concept of ju-
dicial deference to judicial abdication. 
The Ohio Supreme Court took the unnecessary step of engaging 
in a historic debate over the effect of Permian's "zone of rea-
sonableness" test on the Hope "financial integrity" test. Leaving 
aside this ambiguity in constitutional law, the Ohio rate-making 
scheme could have been saved from a takings challenge without 
the court's speculation on the lasting validity of Hope. In the 
circumstances of Cleveland I, the issue of confiscation could have 
been addressed by reference to the financial impact of denying 
recovery. There was every indication, from both company and 
investor analysts, that a denial of recovery would not have seri-
ously jeopardized the future obligations of the utility to its cus-
tomers or the future investments of shareholders.243 The court 
could have simply concluded that the stability of the company was 
not in serious jeopardy. The rate-order, therefore, was well within 
either Permian's "broad zone of reasonableness" or Hope's 
"financial integrity." 
When Cleveland II was appealed to the United States Supreme 
Court, the dismissal for want of a substantial federal question 
only contributed to the confusion over the confiscation doctrine. 
~40 104 S. Ct. 47, 78 L.Ed. 68 (1983). 
,"1 Permian, 390 U.S. 769. 
~42 See supra text and note at note 192. 
~43 Justice Lochner, in his concurring opinion in Cleveland I, was impressed by the 
utility's Annual Report of 1979, where shareholders were told that a denial of recovery 
"should not have a material adverse impact on the financial position of the Company." 67 
O.O.3d at 107, 423 N.E.2d at 831. As one company official. pointed out, "~espite t~e 
downturn [in stock prices], CEl is a strong, well-run company; we're not In financial 
trouble." ENERGY USERS NEWS, Feb. 1, 1982. 
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If, as both courts and commentators maintain, the dismissal is a 
ruling on the merits,244 it might also indicate the Court's willing-
ness to accept Dayton's pronouncements that "the Constitution 
no longer provides any protection for the utility investor."245 Be-
cause a summary disposition can occur only after a cursory re-
view of the case, it w.ould seem that the significance of the Court's 
dismissal of Cleveland I I cannot indicate more than its willingness 
to accept the outcome that Ohio law does not violate the fifth and 
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Dayton's sweeping assertion about the confiscation doctrine 
and public utilities presented a compelling reason for the United 
States Supreme Court to accept the appeal and issue a full opin-
ion. The summary dismissal leaves unresolved the future of the 
Hope "financial integrity" test during a time of increased cancel-
lations and a growing desire by courts and commissions to receive 
guidance on the issue. If the Ohio Supreme Court's analysis is 
followed, the task of judicial review will be.highly deferential and 
quite possibly an inaccurate reading of constitutional law. On the 
other hand, an application of the Hope standard requires the 
Court's attention to economic factors which indicate the degree of 
operational success and financial integrity. 
While the application of Ohio law to CEI would seem to pass the 
more stringent test of Hope, other cancellations require more 
difficult judicial decisions. For example, the Public Service Com-
pany of Indiana has claimed that without relief connected with 
the cancellation of the half-built, $2.5 billion Marble Hill nuclear 
project, bankruptcy will result.246 If Indiana's regulatory agency 
denied all recovery through the ratebase, a court would have to 
apply the Hope test by assessing financial stability and determin-
ing whether a confiscation had occurred. This determination in-
volves economic conjecture, and is arguably beyond the compe-
tency of the judiciary. The alternative, however, is a sweeping 
denial of any constitutional protection. As this article suggests, 
this approach is not well grounded in legal precedent. 
244 See supra note 238. 
245 See supra text at note 234. 
246 N.Y. Times, at D1, cols. 5-7. The history of Marble Hill is a familiar one. Construc-
tion began in 1975, when the Public Service Company of Indiana was experiencing 
steady growth. The plant's future was jeopardized by conservation efforts and regula-
tory lag. The cost increased from the original projection of $1.4 billion to over $7 billion. 
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